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Abstract 
This thesis is a contribution to applied relevant logics. In 
Part One relevant logics are presented proof-theoretically 
and semantically. These logics are then extended to modal 
logics. Completeness proofs for all of the logics presented 
in Part One are provided. In Part Two, the logics of Part 
One are applied to certain problems in philosophical logic 
and Artificial Intelligence. Deontic and epistemic logics 
based on relevant logics are presented in chapter three and 
chapter four contains an extensive investigation of the logic 
of theory change (or database updating). 
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Introduction 
This dissertation is a contribution to the study of relevant logics. Its 
emphasis is on applications. Such an emphasis, I believe, is timely. For 
the purely philosophical debate about the notion of entailment has reached 
a deadlock. It has issued on the one side in an elaborate classical 
epicycle1 and on the other side in a rich fundus of well-investigated 
alternatives to classical logic.2 The divide between these two sides is 
unlikely to become permeable by further reflections on the elusive notion 
of entailment ot introspection of one's linguistic intuitions about if. .. 
then.... Progress, however, can perhaps be made by observing the 
contenders "in use" rather than in vacuo. 
Almost coinciding with the decline of the entailment debate within 
the philosophical community is the increasing interest in non-classical 
logics among researchers in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It has become 
plain in recent years that for the solution of many problems in AI, 
classical logic is either not suited at all ot an extremely cumbersome tool 
to use. Thus, in AI, alternatives to classical logic are now considered and 
evaluated free from the philosophical prejudices hardened in a seven 
decades spanning debate about "deviant" logics - non-classical logics 
suddenly get a "fair go". 
The present dissertation attempts to take advantage of the open-
minded attitude with which various logics are now considered in AI. 
Thus, the applications of relevant logics in Part Two of this dissertation 
are presented with a view to problems in AI. These problems fall under 
the heading of database theory. Chapter three offers some tools for 
reasoning about databases in a fixed state; chapter four treats the problem 
of database updating. In more traditional terms, however, these chapters 
contain also contributions to philosophical logic: chapter three presents 
some epistetuic and deontic logics based on relevant logics, and chapter 
four is an exercise in the logic of theory change. The discussion in Part 
Two will frequently switch between philosophy and AI. Such a transfer 
of ideas, I believe, is beneficial to both disciplines. 
Chapter one provides a grounding in the proof theory and semantics 
of relevant logics. We give axiomatic formulations of a group of logics, 
starting from a very weak system BM and proceeding to classical logic K 
via the comparatively strong relevant logics of Anderson and Belnap 
1 See e.g. Jackson (1987). 
2 See e.g. Routley, Meyer et al. (1982). 
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(1975) and the semi-relevant systems RM ("Mingle") and RM3. All of 
these logics will be proved complete with respect to appropriate classes of 
model structures (frames) of the kind used in Routley, Meyer, et al. 
(1982). The aim of this chapter is to provide a self-contained 
completeness argument for all of the major relevant logics (and a few 
more) as a background to the following chapters. In presenting this 
argument I have benefited from Dunn's survey article on relevant logics 
(1986). 
In chapter two we shall consider extensions of the systems presented 
in chapter one in a language including a unary modal operator. The 
resulting modal systems will be proved sound and complete with·respect 
to two extensions of the semantics introduced in chapter one. The two 
extensions are, first, a Kripke-style semantics, modelling the modal 
operator by means of a binary accessibility relation, and, secondly, a 
Montague-Scott-style semantics in which the modal operator is modelled 
by means of a so-called neighbourhood function. 
In Part Two, we shall put the systems of Part One to use. The 
modal logics of chapter two will be used in chapter three as a means to 
represent and reason about the static properties of theories of various 
kinds. We shall consider in some detail two kinds of theories: sets of 
sentences an agent is committed to accept as true at a particular point of 
time ("acceptance sets"), and sets of sentences an agent is committed to 
make true at a particular point of time ("norm sets"). As a result of these 
considerations, logics of acceptance (or commitment-to-believe) and of 
obligation will emerge. We shall refrain from enshrining in these logics 
idealising assumptions about acceptance sets and norm sets; in particular, 
we shall not assume that such sets are always consistent The possibility, 
and indeed actuality, of inconsistent but non-trivial acceptance and norm 
sets will motivate the move towards epistemic and deontic logics based 
on a paraconsistent logic. The concern with representing correctly the 
deductive dependencies within acceptance sets and norm sets will 
motivate a move towards epistemic and deontic logics based on a relevant 
logic. 
Chapter four focuses on certain dynamic aspects of theories. The 
study of the formal aspects of theory change - though a natural 
complement to the investigations of Tarski (1930) - has been curiously 
neglected for a long time. A beginning has only recently been made in 
the work of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson. Though squarely 
based within the framework provided by these three authors, the present 
contribution to the theory of theory change differs in a number of aspects 
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from their work. First, Alchourron, Glirdenfors and Makinson (AGM) 
consider changes of theories by one sentence at a time. I consider 
multiple changes: changes by sets of sentences at a time. Changes by 
single sentences will emerge as a special case of multiple changes, 
namely as changes by singleton sets of sentences. Secondly, AGM think 
of theories as sets of sentences closed under logical consequence; theories 
are thus rather amorphous objects. I think of theories as sets of sentences 
generated from a distinguished set of sentences (the base of the theory in 
question) by means of a logical consequence operation. As I shall argue 
in chapter four, the base of a theory does play an important role in 
changing a theory. Thirdly, a central concern for AGM is that changes to 
theories ought to be minimal: a changed theory should be as big a subset 
of the original theory as possible under the circumstances. I shall argue 
that minimality of change is a rule of thumb that may easily be 
overridden by other constraints on theory change. One such constraint -
not recognised in the work of AGM - is that if a sentence B is in a 
theory just because A is in that theory, then B should not remain in the 
theory after A has been removed. I call this constraint on theory change 
'the filtering condition'. Fourthly, for AGM, theories are closed under a 
consequence operation provided by classical logic. In view of classical 
theses like A~.~ A ~B and A ~.B ~A, the change of inconsistent 
theories and the removal of logical truths from a theory receive a rather 
special treatment in AGM's theory. The theory advanced in this 
dissertation will be more general: any one of the logics of chapter one 
may provide the consequence operation theories are closed under. 
However, as I shall argue in chapter four, ouly if theories are closed 
under a non-classical, relevant, consequence operation, does a satisfactory 
account of how inconsistent theories ought to change and how to remove 
logical truths from a theory emerge. 
The chapters of Part Two complement each other in a 
straightforward sense: while chapter three provides a formal framework 
for reasoning about theories at a particular point of time, theories as they 
"move" along a time axis are the subject of formal investigations in 
chapter four. The formal tools employed in these chapters are, however, 
quite distinct. Whereas modal logics provide the background for chapter 
three, Tarski's theory of consequence operations is the unifying theory 
behind the considerations in chapter four. In the final section of this 
dissertation, an outlook on one way of bringing to bear modal logic on 
the theory of theory change will be given by employing the resources of 
dynamic logic in order to formulate a logic of theory change. 
